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ABBREVIATIONS*
€ Euro
AIAF Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCB Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA Average total assets
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
bn Billions
bp Basis points
CBE Banco de España Circular
CBSO Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDOs Collateralised debt obligations
CDS Credit Default Swap
CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
CIs Credit institutions
CNMV Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs Deposit institutions
EAD Exposure at default
ECB European Central Bank
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSR Financial Stability Report
FVCs Financial vehicle corporations
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GVA Gross value added
GVAmp Gross value added at market prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
ICO Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
LGD Loss given default
LTV Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
m Millions
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs Money market funds
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
PD Probability of default
PER Price earnings ratio
pp Percentage points
ROA Return on assets
ROE Return on equity
RWA Risk-weighted assets
SCIs Specialised credit institutions
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIVs Structured investment vehicles
SPV Special-purpose vehicle
TA Total assets
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
VaR Value at risk
WTO World Trade Organisation
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Introduction
Since the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), the extreme difficulty experienced by the inter-
national financial system and the world economy has shown signs of improving, though doubts 
persist over the sustainability of this recovery. In the financial arena, especially since 2009 Q2, 
there have been signs of improvement, manifest in stock market prices and in the easing in the 
main financial stress indicators. Consequently, some of the markets most affected by a wide-
spread loss of confidence, especially in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, are 
progressively returning to normal, as is the case with the covered bonds market. Nonetheless, 
other significant markets, such as that for securitisations, continued to show signs of difficulty. 
As from 2009 Q2 there have been positive signs of a pick-up in the world economy, albeit with 
doubts over the intensity of the recovery and its distribution by geographical area. In any event, 
it is not foreseeable that the high growth rates marking the previous boom period will be re-
sumed in the short term. 
The exceptional and temporary fiscal, monetary and financial-system-support measures 
adopted by the public authorities internationally have undoubtedly contributed to the improve-
ments observed. In any event, the fragilities discussed in the previous paragraph mean par-
ticular caution is called for when considering a withdrawal of these support measures. The 
need to make the sustainability of the recovery compatible with the withdrawal of these ex-
traordinary measures in the medium term is, possibly, the biggest difficulty conditioning eco-
nomic policy design in the coming years. 
Economic activity in Spain continues to contract and the unemployment rate is still rising, al-
beit at a more moderate rate than in previous quarters, and stands at a high level. As to the 
financial markets, some such as those for covered bonds and capital instruments have shown 
signs of picking up. However, there is clear dispersion, both in prices and volumes, in favour 
of those institutions perceived as most sound. 
Accordingly, and as indicated in the previous FSR, the strong downturn in economic activity 
has continued influencing risks on bank balance sheets. The slowdown in credit persists, 
which is due to demand-side factors in the face of adverse economic circumstances and to a 
tightening of supply-side conditions, in response to the rise in bad debts. That said, such 
tightening is estimated to have moderated in recent months. 
In terms of their recent growth, doubtful assets have shown signs of moderating, although they 
continue to rise at a high rate. This is feeding through to doubtful assets ratios, which will con-
tinue rising insofar as the downturn in real activity and employment persists. The increase in the 
ratios is related to the exposure to economic sectors whose behaviour is more closely linked to 
the business cycle. This is the case of the property development sector, which is why the present 
FSR offers information that allows the dimension of the problem to be put into perspective. 
Nonetheless, the particular banking business strategy and risk management policy pursued by 
each institution translate, as is usual in all sharp slowdowns, into a high degree of heterogene-
ity across institutions. The growth of doubtful assets ratios depends on the economy’s cyclical 
position, but even so the rate of increase and the level attained differ for different banks. The 
reason for this is that, in the long economic growth phase the Spanish economy enjoyed, 
banks have not followed the same strategies: not all of them have grown with the same force, 
and nor do they have the same degree of sectoral exposure. Even for banks similarly exposed 
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to the same economic sectors, differences can be perceived as regards the selection of risks 
and their subsequent management. In sum, the outcome of the different lending policies pur-
sued by banks is that adverse events pass through to their balance sheets and income state-
ments in the form of effects of a different relative scale.
Funding difficulties on wholesale markets have been alleviated, especially for the soundest 
institutions, which have made issues without the backing of the State. Moreover, several 
banks, including some medium-sized ones, have issued covered bonds with yield spreads far 
lower than the high levels reached early in Q2, and close to those prevailing before the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That shows the move towards the normalisation of this financial 
market segment, whose functioning had been greatly affected following the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers. In any event, funding difficulties persist for some Spanish banks, though these 
have been eased, as they have in other countries’ banks, by the extraordinary interventions by 
the authorities (e.g. the granting of guarantees for new issues). 
Income statements, albeit with differing intensity at different banks, remain subject to down-
ward pressure. That said, the results recorded to end-June 2009 may be considered positive 
in the present circumstances, and comparatively better than those at many institutions in bank-
ing systems in other developed countries. The increase in the net interest margin and the 
moderation of operating expenses have proven to be the main favourable factors here. But they 
have not been able to offset the notable impact of specific provisions, which reflect the increase 
in bad debts, an impact only partly mitigated by the general provisions set aside. Furthermore, 
doubts persist over the sustainability of the net interest margin in the medium run. 
The solvency ratio of Spanish deposit institutions has increased compared with the previous 
year, with both the total and the tier 1 ratios standing above the required minimal level for 
regulatory purposes. An international comparison of solvency levels places Spanish institu-
tions in an intermediate position, although it should be borne in mind that many banks from 
other countries received sizeable public funds to shore up their capital. 
The uncertainty posed by the macroeconomic and financial situation means that banks must 
take into consideration various medium-term factors to attain an appropriate level of profitabil-
ity. Firstly, it is not foreseeable that banking will resume the rate of expansion seen in the past, 
since the deleveraging of the financial sector and of the economy as a whole cannot be con-
sidered as a temporary phenomenon. This, combined with the possibility that spreads be-
tween the return on assets and liabilities will narrow, or that they will not at least trend as fa-
vourably as they have done so far this year, will act as a notable factor of pressure on the net 
interest margin, the main driving force of the income statement at present. Secondly, given the 
current economic climate, bad debts will conceivably continue on the rise, which will entail 
higher specific provisions, placing further downward pressure on income and, therefore, on 
capital levels. In these circumstances, merely controlling operating expenses would not ap-
pear to be a sufficient management strategy, especially for banks with excess capacity in the 
current circumstances, which start from a less favourable position in terms of profitability and 
solvency, or for those for which the impact of the above-mentioned factors of pressure is more 
acute. Accordingly, depending on their particular circumstances, banks must address proc-
esses that enable them to streamline their operating costs and improve their management, 
adapting their structure and capacity to a situation consistent with the lower growth of banking 
and of the economy in general.
The recently created Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks (FROB) should be seen in 
this respect as an instrument that may pave the way for the rationalisation of management and 
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the adaptation of capacity to the new environment in which the Spanish financial system is 
going to operate. Given the foreseeable continuing pressure on the income statement stem-
ming from rising doubtful assets, along with the persistent uncertainty over the profitability of 
a significant number of institutions’ core business, the FROB will step up its activity in the com-
ing months. What is more, this more intensive use of the FROB will be vital for helping make 
the inevitable restructuring of the financial system compatible with the financing of the produc-
tive economy once the current recession has been overcome.

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2009
1 Macroeconomic risks and financial markets
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report the international financial situation 
has improved, with a resumption of capital flows towards higher-risk assets (reflected in share 
price rises and reductions in lending spreads) and a decline in volatility. In parallel, a recovery 
has been observed in confidence in the international banking system, which posted results 
generally better than anticipated. These developments arose in a setting marked by favourable 
macroeconomic news and by the continuity and deepening of the fiscal and monetary stimu-
lus measures applied since the onset of the crisis. But this improvement in the international 
macroeconomic and financial situation is not free from risks and doubts concerning its sus-
tainability. Hence, although the risk of the financial system collapsing has diminished, there are 
still major market segments whose dynamism is only sustained by the support of public-sector 
programmes. The economic recovery is unfolding unevenly across the different geographical 
areas, and is closely linked to economic policy stimuli and to the positive momentum of the 
stockbuilding cycle. Moreover, the pace of recovery remains slow, some vulnerabilities persist 
in certain financial market segments, and households in many economies remain immersed in 
a process of deleveraging and the re-building of their saving rates. 
The ongoing normalisation of and recovery in confidence in the financial sector has been no-
table in the United States, the epicentre of the financial crisis, as financial institutions are re-
ducing their resort to several public support programmes, such as the issuance of guaranteed 
debt and the liquidity support facilities of the Federal Reserve. One factor that may have con-
tributed to this has been the performance and subsequent publication by the US authorities of 
the results of the stress tests on the main banks. This exercise lessened the uncertainty hang-
ing over these banks and, probably, was instrumental in the recovery of private investment in 
the capital of the main US banks, whereby many of them have managed to repay the public 
aid received under the TARP programme. 
There was also an improvement on money markets, with interbank/OIS spreads standing 
below the level observed before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Chart 1.1 A). The recov-
ery was also seen in the credit markets, meaning that corporate lending spreads narrowed 
substantially, although in the case of companies with a worse credit rating, spreads were still 
at a far higher level than their historical average (Chart 1.1 B). The recovery in confidence 
prompted an increase in debt issues by financial and non-financial corporations, although in 
the case of the former, such issues were greatly influenced by the measures enacted by the 
economic authorities, through programmes offering public backing to issues and others pur-
chasing assets, such as, for instance, the Eurosystem’s acquisition of guaranteed bonds 
(Box 2.3). 
The pick-up in stock market indices seen since late March continued, in the developed and 
emerging countries alike (Chart 1.1 C), and was accompanied by a significant reduction in 
volatility (Chart 1.1 D). During this period, however, corrections were also observed in certain 
equity markets, such as in those in China, which had accumulated far higher than average 
gains. Bank share prices generally rose to a greater extent than those of the other sectors, 
boosted by the recovery in confidence and by the reporting, especially in the case of US 
banks, of better-than-expected results for the first half of the year.
On government debt markets, risk premia on credit derivatives markets and interest rates on 
long-term government debt have moved on a slightly falling trend in recent months, in contrast 
Improvement in the 
international 
macroeconomic and 
financial situation in a setting 
marked by the maintenance 
of the public-sector support 
measures…
… but an improvement not 
free from risks. 
This normalisation has 
provided for a recovery in 
confidence in the banking 
sector and for less resort to 
certain financial support 
programmes, especially in 
the United States.
Across-the-board 
improvement in money and 
credit markets...
 
… with an increase in debt 
issues.
Stock markets also showed 
an across-the-board 
improvement. 
On the government debt 
markets, the upward course
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to the increases observed from the beginning of the year. These developments came about 
despite the fact that public finances continue to worsen in several countries, and in spite of the 
brighter outlook for economic activity and the incipient signs of recovery. The recent course of 
long-term interest rates would suggest that the path of recovery discounted by the markets 
may be less vigorous than that seen in previous episodes. 
During 2009 Q2 there was a clear turning point in global economic activity, largely associated 
with the strong impulse provided by macroeconomic policies and with the stockbuilding cycle. 
After two consecutive quarters in which world GDP contracted at a rate of around 1.4% on the 
preceding quarter, positive growth of 0.6% was observed in 2009 Q2. This rise in Q2 was es-
sentially due to the strong recovery in economic activity in Asia, especially in China, while the 
main developed economies continued shrinking, albeit at much more moderate rates. 
Following the marked fall-off in economic activity in the euro area in the last three months of 
2008 and the first three months of the current year, a slight contraction was recorded in 2009 
Q2. The quarter-on-quarter growth rate of euro area GDP in this period was –0.2%, compared 
of long-term yields was 
interrupted.
Economic activity improved 
and even grew in some 
areas. 
Activity in the euro area 
contracted in 2009 Q2, but 
did so very moderately. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
 IBEX 35
 EUROSTOXX 50
 S&P 500
D. IMPLIED VOLATILITIES (a)
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
 IBEX 35
 EUROSTOXX 50
 S&P 500
 MSCI EMERGING MARKETS
1.1.2006 = 100
C. STOCK EXCHANGE INDICES
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09
 EMBI GLOBAL
 EURO AREA 10-YEAR HIGH–YIELD BOND
 US 10-YEAR HIGH–YIELD BOND
bp
B. BOND SPREADS BY REGION
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09
 EURO AREA
 UNITED STATES
 UNITED KINGDOM
bp
A. 1-YEAR LIBOR – OIS (OVERNIGHT INDEX 
SWAP) SPREADS
MARKETS CHART 1.1
SOURCE: Datastream.
a. Five-day moving averages.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2009
with –2.5% in Q1 (Chart 1.2.A). As discussed, this lower rate of decline in output has coin-
cided with the emergence of some signs of normalisation on financial markets and with an 
improvement in the confidence indicators. Last September the ECB revised its macroeco-
nomic projections for this year and 2010 slightly downwards, placing euro area GDP in real 
terms at between –3.8% and –4.4% in 2009, and between 0.9% and –0.5% in 2010. The 
uncertainty surrounding these projections remains exceptionally high.
The improvement in the indicators of economic activity at the international level in Q3 suggests 
that the macroeconomic expansion is spreading across geographical areas, auguring growth 
at positive rates in many economies. Growth projections for 2009 and 2010 have been revised 
upwards more or less across the board. 
In Spain, the pace of the contraction in economic activity also eased off in 2009 Q2. In quarter-
on-quarter terms, GDP fell by 1.1%, following the 1.6% decline recorded three months earlier. 
The year-on-year rate, which is subject to greater inertia, stood at –4.2%, 1 pp below the figure 
for the previous quarter (Chart 1.2 A). At the root of this decrease was national demand, the 
reduction in which (–6.9% year-on-year) was partly offset by the behaviour of net external 
demand, which contributed 3.1 pp to GDP growth, as a result of a reduction in imports (22.3%) 
that was greater than that in exports (15.7%). 
There was some slowing in the rate of job destruction in Q2, with employment falling by 7.3% 
year-on-year on EPA (Labour Force Survey) figures. This decline and the increase in the labour 
force raised the unemployment rate by 0.6 pp in relation to March (to 17.9%, Chart 1.2.B). The 
latest EPA data suggest that during the summer months the year-on-year rate of decline in 
employment held at around the same figure as in June.
The interest rates applied by banks to households and firms in lending transactions continued 
to decline during the first half of 2009, albeit to a lesser extent than interbank yields. According 
to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), the increase in margins is expected to have affected higher-
risk loans to a greater extent. During the first half of 2009, and again on BLS figures, it is esti-
The macroeconomic 
projections have been 
revised slightly upwards. 
The data for Q3 suggest 
that the expansion in activity 
may be expected to spread 
across geographical areas. 
In Spain, economic activity 
contracted once again, 
albeit at a more moderate 
rate than in the previous 
quarter…
… and the decline in 
employment held at around 
the same rate as in June.
Interest rates on credit fell, 
and banks moderated the 
tightening of lending 
standards.
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mated that banks continued to tighten lending standards, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 
preceding months, following the strong tightening observed in 2008. In line with this trend, 
banks indicated that during Q3 they applied similar lending standards to those of the previous 
quarter (they were only slightly more restrictive in lending to households and firms for pur-
poses other than house purchase). The demand for bank financing perceived by the banks 
reporting to the survey is estimated to have continued falling in recent months, but increas-
ingly at a lesser pace.1
During the first half of 2009, the slowdown in lending to the non-financial private sector con-
tinued, taking the seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter rate into negative territory. As a result 
of this and of the course of income, household and corporate debt ratios held stable during 
Q2 while the reduction in financing costs prompted a decline in the aggregate interest burden 
on both sectors. Household net wealth continued declining relative to gross disposable in-
come during the same period. 
In sum, although more moderately than in previous months, recession in the Spanish economy 
extended into 2009 Q2 and unemployment rose. As a result, the proportion of agents under a 
high degree of financial pressure has continued to increase, the reflection of which has been a 
further rise in doubtful assets ratios.
The interest burden on 
households and firms has 
fallen and their debt ratios 
have stabilised, but the ratio 
of household net wealth to 
household gross disposable 
income has declined once 
more.
The economic recession in 
Spain is raising the 
proportion of agents facing 
a high degree of financial 
pressure.
1. For further details see J. Martínez Pagés (2009), “Encuesta sobre Préstamos Bancarios en España: octubre de 2009”, 
Boletín Económico, October, Banco de España.
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2 Deposit institutions and other financial market participants
Financial institutions face a situation which continues to be very difficult, first because of the 
weakened credit quality of their balance sheets, and second because the improvement in the 
financial markets does not mean that the difficulties in obtaining funding have disappeared. 
Indeed, some markets which were of fundamental importance before the summer of 2007, 
such as the securitisation market, continue to be closed. The recovery of the financial markets 
does not mean, moreover, that all institutions have the same access to them, since this de-
pends on each institution’s financial position. Thus, for example, the interbank market is only 
open to large, highly solvent institutions. In any event, the funding needs of deposit institutions 
from Spain and other countries have been alleviated by the measures taken by the ECB and 
by governments, which in Spain took the form of the provision of guarantees for debt issuance 
and the creation of a fund for the acquisition of high-quality assets. In addition, Spanish institu-
tions reacted by stepping up their efforts to attract traditional deposits, a response facilitated 
by their retail banking model.
The weakness of the real economy is putting downward pressure on the credit quality of finan-
cial institutions’ balance sheets. For Spanish deposit institutions the pressure on doubtful as-
sets is still significant and their judicious management is crucial, especially for institutions which 
have been more strongly impacted as a result of riskier asset policies in the past.
The different responses adopted by institutions in their risk management and the differences 
in their profitability, provisions and solvency mean that the impact of this more adverse situa-
tion will not be uniform across institutions. The newly created Fund for the Orderly Restructur-
ing of Banks (FROB) will help to smooth the process of adjustment, since it will act whenever 
any particular institution finds itself in difficulties, ensuring the minimum cost for taxpayers 
(Box 2.1). In any event, institutions have to properly assess their present and future financial 
position and, if necessary, undertake resizing to adjust to the new reality in which the sector 
has to operate.
The consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions grew by 10.4% in June 2009 (Ta-
ble 2.1). This increase was further boosted by the acquisitions of foreign institutions made in 
recent months, mainly by a large Spanish institution. Excluding this institution from the analy-
sis, the increase in total consolidated assets was more moderate, showing growth of 5.10% 
(9.7% in June 2008). Also, the total assets of business in Spain grew by 5.5% in June 2009 
(9.9% in the same period of 2008). The growth rate of total assets varied from one institution 
to another. The heterogeneity of institutions is also apparent from an analysis of the distribution 
of assets by corporate group. Thus consolidated assets are distributed unevenly among insti-
tutions: the five largest account for 59.6% of total assets, while the next twenty represent 
24.1% and the remainder 16.3%.
The moderation in the growth of bank balance sheets, noted in previous FSRs, is largely ex-
plained by the behaviour of financing to the private sector (credit and fixed income) and, in 
particular, by the deceleration of credit. The more moderate growth of lending is consistent 
with the weaknesses still persisting in the real economy due to lower demand and to the 
greater caution of institutions in granting loans amidst rising bad debts.
The economic slump largely explains the increase in doubtful assets, which continues apace 
(170.6% in June 2009), although more slowly than in December 2008 (year-on-year increase 
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 BANKING RISKS 
The extremely difficult 
situation in the financial 
system and the world 
economy eased in 2009, 
although the situation 
continues to be difficult for 
financial institutions. There 
are market segments which 
are still closed…
… and the management of 
doubtful assets  is 
fundamental, especially for 
institutions which have 
pursued riskier lending 
policies,…
… or which are less 
resilient. 
The consolidated assets of 
Spanish institutions continue 
to grow at a moderate 
pace…
… which is explained 
basically by the slowdown in 
lending.
Doubtful assets continue to 
grow sharply, although the
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of 238.8%). The moderation in the growth rate of doubtful assets, favoured by the lower inter-
est rates, did not prevent the doubtful assets ratio from continuing to rise (3.3% in June 2009, 
1.3% a year earlier and 0.7% in June 2007). The lower growth of doubtful assets is apparent 
also in July and August, as discussed below in greater detail. In any event, in a macroeco-
nomic setting which will not recover fully for some time yet, doubtful assets will continue to rise 
in the coming months. 
Notable on the liabilities side was the growth in deposits from central banks. In line with events 
in the Eurosystem as a whole, the net loan (the funds received in liquidity providing operations 
minus those deposited in liquidity withdrawal operations) has been growing since the escala-
tion of the international financial market tensions. However, the net loan from the Eurosystem 
to Spanish institutions is consistent with the size of the Spanish economy in the euro area. 
Moreover, this net loan from the Eurosystem continues to have a relatively low weight in the 
balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions (1.9% in June 2009).
The balance of the “Deposits from credit institutions” heading decreased by 1.7% in June 
2009 and its relative weight in bank balance sheet fell. This development, which was also 
seen on the assets side (“Loans and advances to credit insitutions”), reflects the persistent 
difficulties in interbank markets, which are only open to the large, more solvent institu-
tions.
The difficulties still persisting in international financial markets are apparent in the year-on-year 
fall in marketable securities (–4.8%), which nevertheless showed quarter-on-quarter increases 
in March and June, reflecting the improvement in financial markets. However, not all institu-
tions have the same ability to access these markets, since it depends on their financial posi-
tion. In consonance with the aforementioned signs of a certain recovery, subordinated debt, 
which includes preference shares, grew strongly in June 2009 (17.6%, against 1.2% in De-
cember 2008 and against 2.1% in June 2008), and this also helped to strengthen the level of 
Spanish institutions’ own funds. 
In response to the difficulties besetting international funding markets, Spanish deposit institu-
tions increased their capacity to raise deposits from the private sector. Despite the lower rate 
of increase over the last few months, the June 2009 data show that they are still growing1 at a 
rate which, although slower, exceeds that of credit to the private sector.
Own funds grew by 11.0% in June 2009 and their relative weight in the total balance sheet 
remained at the levels of June 2008 (5.5%). As indicated in the last FSR, the negative amount 
of the valuation adjustments to equity is explained by exchange differences, the result of in-
cluding the business abroad of Spanish deposit institutions in the balance sheet in a period in 
which the euro appreciated.
As a result of the aforementioned acquisitions, the relative weight of business abroad in the 
consolidated total assets of deposit institutions was 23.5% in June 2009 (19.9% in June 
2008). The presence of Spanish institutions, through subsidiaries, initially focused on emerging 
Latin-American countries (exposure to eastern European countries is very low) has been diver-
sifying towards other geographical areas, such as the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, 
the USA.
rate is moderating, a trend 
which is reflected in the 
doubtful loans ratio.
The funds obtained from the 
Eurosystem continue to 
have little weight in 
institutions’ balance sheets.
The improvement on the 
markets has allowed 
institutions to issue 
preference shares and thus 
strengthen their capital,…
… whereas deposits, while 
expanding at a more 
moderate pace, continue to 
grow faster than credit.
Own funds have also grown.
The relative weight of 
business abroad increased 
as a result of some recent 
acquisitions.
1. The growth of this variable in the consolidated balance sheet is boosted by the aforementioned acquisition of foreign 
institutions by a large Spanish institution. However, excluding this institution, deposits still show positive rates of change 
which exceed the growth rate of credit.
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ASSETS JUN-09
CHANGE
JUN-09/
JUN-08
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-08
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-09
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 108,739 99 1.6 2.9
Loans and advances to credit institutions 224,231 -21 8.4 6.0
General government 69,269 24 1.6 1.8
Other private sectors 2,412,475 6 67.0 64.3
Debt securities 478,843 37 10.3 12.8
Other equity instruments 70,171 -24 2.7 1.9
Investments 35,860 -25 1.4 1.0
Derivatives 171,071 52 3.3 4.6
Tangible assets 44,605 22 1.1 1.2
Other (a) 135,355 58 2.5 3.6
TOTAL ASSETS 3,750,619 10 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,561,029 7 70.5 68.3
Financing to general government 294,517 46 5.9 7.9
Total doubtful assets 104,226 171 1.1 2.8
Total doubtful assets ratio 3.28 198 (c)
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 62,991 38 1.3 1.7
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY JUN-09
CHANGE
JUN-09/
JUN-08
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-08
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-09
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 156,243 136 2.0 4.2
Deposits from credit institutions 496,507 -2 14.9 13.2
General government 108,338 33 2.4 2.9
Other private sectors 1,710,693 12 44.8 45.6
Marketable debt securities 634,386 -5 19.6 16.9
Derivatives 159,047 22 3.8 4.2
Subordinated debt 103,364 18 2.6 2.8
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 36,313 11 1.0 1.0
Other (a) 133,848 31 3.0 3.2
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,538,739 11 94.1 94.4
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Eurosystem net lending (b) 70,703 1.39 1.89
Minority interests 10,352 1 0.3 0.3
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -6,294 0.1 -0.2
Own funds 207,822 11 5.5 5.5
TOTAL EQUITY 211,880 6 5.9 5.6
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,750,619 10 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
TOTAL ASSETS OF:
JUN-09
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-08
RELATIVE
WEIGHT
JUN-09
(€m) (%) (%)
Five biggest banks 2,236,166 57.0 59.6
Twenty next biggest banks 902,248 25.8 24.1
Other banks 612,205 17.2 16.3
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including 
valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b.  Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds 
delivered in absorbing operations.
c. Difference calculated in bp.
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The Spanish financial system has demonstrated its strength and sol-
vency in facing the challenges arising from the financial crisis. This is 
the result of several factors: among others, its practically nil exposure 
to toxic assets, prudent risk management and the establishment of a 
regulatory framework which encourages implementation of these 
prudent management practices. In short, Spanish institutions have 
adopted a more traditional banking management model, far removed 
from the originate to distribute model.
However, the Spanish financial system is not immune to the deepen-
ing and quickening of the financial crisis, characterised by certain 
endogenous factors such as developments in the property market in 
Spain and the cyclical position of the economy, which is now facing a 
significant recession. On this basis, it is appropriate to tackle the 
process of bank restructuring, as has occurred in the past in other 
economic sectors. 
In principle, this process could be based solely on traditional individ-
ual crisis-resolution mechanisms with the participation of the Depos-
it Guarantee Funds (DGFs), which act not only in a compensatory but 
also in a restructuring capacity. However, the situation created by the 
international financial crisis has compelled financial authorities to take 
pre-emptive steps with the creation of this new instrument, the FROB, 
through the approval of Royal Decree-Law 9/2009. The ultimate aim 
of this strategy is to provide for an orderly restructuring process so 
that capacity may be tailored to the foreseeable size of the banking 
industry in the future.
The FROB’s actions will be governed according to the following prin-
ciples:
– The restructuring process must be based on the traditional 
crisis-resolution process in Spain.
– The FROB is a subsidiary mechanism for action.
– It must look for solutions for individual credit institutions which 
minimise the cost for the public. 
– Widespread recapitalisation plans are avoided, by treating the 
problems of credit institutions individually.
– It promotes the accountability of shareholders and managers 
of the institutions subject to a restructuring process.
As for its legal regime, the FROB has been endowed initially with 
€9 bn, €6.75 bn were contributed by the State and €2.25 bn by the 
DGFs. Furthermore, it may raise borrowed funds for up to three times 
this figure, increasing the initial amount assigned by up to ten times 
from 1 January 2010 subject to authorisation from the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance. The FROB is governed by a Management 
Committee with five representatives of the Banco de España and 
three representatives of the DGFs and a representative of the Na-
tional Audit Office who will attend meetings with the right to speak but 
not to vote.
As for the FROB’s actions, Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 envisages first-
ly restructuring processes of institutions which present weaknesses 
that may affect their viability, as follows:
– Initially, the institution affected will look for a private solution 
involving the strengthening of its solvency.
– In the absence of a private solution, the next stage is to adopt 
measures with the participation of the DGFs. Accordingly, the 
institution must submit an action plan to the Banco de España 
which may include the following courses of action: strengthen-
ing capital and solvency, participating in a merger or the full or 
partial transfer of its business. The FROB may extend financing 
to the DGFs so that they can provide the aid. 
– If a solution cannot be reached through the above-mentioned 
channels, the FROB will take control of the institution and will 
be appointed as its provisional administrator. In such cases, a 
restructuring plan will be drawn up, the purpose of which will 
be the merger or takeover of the institution or the full or partial 
transfer of its assets and liabilities. The plan may include man-
agement and financial support measures such as the provi-
sion of guarantees, the acquisition of assets or equity securi-
ties.
Apart from the restructuring processes, the FROB may also facilitate 
mergers between institutions which are aimed at consolidating their 
medium-term efficiency by strengthening the capital of the resulting 
institution. In this case, institutions must submit a merger plan includ-
ing improvements in efficiency, in rationalisation of their administration 
and the restructuring of their production capacity. In this case, the 
FROB may temporarily acquire preferential holdings which can be 
converted into ordinary shares, non-voting equity units or capital con-
tributions. 
One aspect creating some confusion is how swiftly the FROB must 
act. Aside from the fact that the prompt implementation of restructur-
ing projects benefits the institutions affected, the financial system and 
the economy as a whole, it is necessary to take into account several 
defining elements of the FROB. Firstly, its legal structure establishes 
a series of priorities or steps, initially prioritising voluntary preventive 
operations, on the institutions’ initiative, which, in turn, may contrib-
ute to minimising the use of public funds. Many developed countries 
took swift action. But it must not be forgotten that in all cases the 
impact of the financial crisis on their banks was immediate; an enor-
mous amount of the system was deeply affected, compelling author-
ities to act immediately to prevent it from collapsing. Furthermore, 
while the action in other countries involved bail-outs of individual in-
stitutions, in Spain the emphasis is on the medium-term strengthen-
ing of profitability and solvency through integration processes (which 
need to be planned and implemented more carefully). Lastly, it must 
not be forgotten that a significant part of the Spanish system is made 
up of savings banks (with distinctive government and stewardship 
structures that will tend to draw out the process). In spite of these 
specific characteristics, it would evidently be appropriate to signifi-
cantly speed up integration processes.
In short, the recently created FROB is an instrument which can facili-
tate the rationalisation of management and streamlining of capacity, 
tailoring them to the new environment in which the Spanish financial 
system will be operating. Although the pace at which the FROB acts 
is dictated by both its legal design and the distinctive features of a 
significant part of the Spanish financial system, it is highly likely that it 
will step up its activity in the coming months.
BOX 2.1THE FUND FOR THE ORDERLY RESTRUCTURING OF BANKS (FROB)
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Spanish institutions have internationalised through subsidiaries, typically acquiring pre-existing 
banks with extensive experience of the local markets. The business of these subsidiaries is fully 
compatible with the business model of the Spanish parents (traditional business in local currency), 
which makes for readier incorporation of improvements in the subsidiaries’ management and ef-
ficiency. Moreover, the subsidiaries have to meet the local capital and liquidity requirements, 
which facilitates the management of the potential difficulties that may arise for these institutions. 
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain continued to decelerate, and its growth for de-
posit institutions was 1.1% in June 2009 (10.9% a year earlier). The most recent data available 
indicate that this trend persists (0.6% in July 2009, in year-on-year terms, and virtually un-
changed from the previous year in August 2009). 
The deterioration of the Spanish economy explains this behaviour of credit, which will conceiv-
ably continue as long as there are no clear signs of improvement. The impact of the business 
cycle on credit is explained by the lower demand, but also by supply factors associated with 
the stricter credit standards applied by institutions to their customers in response to the dete-
riorating credit quality. Although the rates of change of lending vary across institutions, the 
slowdown is general, as a result of the impact exerted on this variable by an economy in reces-
sion (Chart 2.1.A).
Sectorally speaking, the slowdown is also general, although differences are apparent 
(Chart 2.1.B). The quarterly data as at June 2009 show that the construction and real estate 
development sector slowed most sharply (–2% in June 2009, 10.3% in June 2008 and 36% 
in June 2007). As reiterated in various FSRs, the performance of this sector is closely tied to 
the business cycle. It thus showed strong growth in the past and is now undergoing a marked 
deceleration. For other non-financial corporations, the borrowing growth of which grew more 
moderately in the past (19.3% in June 2007), not only is the slowdown relatively less sharp, 
but their growth rate in June 2009 was 5.3%.
Lending to households for purposes other than house purchase (basically consumption) un-
derwent the second-highest slowdown, and also showed a decrease in June 2009 (–8% year-
on-year). For its part, lending for house purchase also slowed notably (1.7% in June 2009).
The doubtful assets of the banking sector in Spain continued to grow at very high rates (184% 
in June 2009), although less rapidly in the last few months (287% in March 2009 and 327% in 
December 2008). This is a development common to all sectors and also observed in terms of 
the year-on-year change in their volume (Chart 2.2.A). Contributing positively to this behaviour 
was the low level of interest rates, which partly offsets the difficulties of firms and households 
by relieving their financial burden. The trend towards more contained growth of doubtful assets 
is apparent in the July 2009 data, which show a year-on-year increase of 118%, and in the 
August data (98%).
The doubtful assets ratio of Spanish deposit institutions has continued rising since the last 
FSR. The rise in the doubtful assets ratio was concentrated in the resident private sector 
(which accounts for 95.7% of total doubtful assets) and in June 2009 stood at 4.5% (4.6% in 
July 2009 and 4.9% in August 2009). However, in line with the behaviour of doubtful assets, 
the growth rate of the doubtful assets ratio has slowed (Chart 2.2.B). 
The doubtful assets ratio still stands at levels below those of 1993 (when it reached 8.5%, 
Chart 2.2.C), although its upward movement will persist despite slower doubtful assets growth 
so long as the worsening of real activity and the rise in unemployment continue.
The expansion of Spanish 
institutions is, and has been 
in the past, effected through 
subsidiaries subject to local 
solvency and liquidity 
requirements.
Credit to the private sector 
in Spain continued to 
decelerate…
… due to the situation of the 
real economy, although the 
growth rate varies across 
institutions.
Sectoral analysis shows that 
the slowdown is more 
pronounced in construction 
and property 
development…
… and in lending to 
households for purposes 
other than house purchase.
Doubtful assets grew 
sharply, but less so than in 
previous months, a 
development favoured by 
the lower interest rates.
The doubtful assets ratio of 
the resident private sector 
continue to rise, although 
less rapidly…
…, but their upward 
movement will persist in the 
coming months.
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The increase in doubtful assets largely stems from exposure to the economic sectors which 
have historically shown themselves to be more at risk. This is the case of construction and 
property development, which has a very strongly marked cyclical profile now reflected in its 
high doubtful assets ratio (8.2% on quarterly data for June 2009, Chart 2.2.D), signifi-
cantly above that of the resident private sector (4.5% in June 2009). Other non-financial 
corporations, however, have a much lower doubtful assets ratio (3.3% in June 2009, 
Chart 2.2.D).
There is a positive relation between the level of exposure to construction and property devel-
opment firms and the total doubtful assets ratio, as follows. Institutions which assumed higher 
exposures to this sector in the upturn now report higher total doubtful assets ratios.
However, as argued in past FSRs, apart from different sectoral exposures, the differing doubt-
ful assets ratios of institutions reflect their risk selection and management capabilities. This is 
apparent in the high degree of dispersion of institutions’ doubtful assets ratios, which never-
theless is lower than in 1993 (Chart 2.2.C). Moreover, this dispersion is observed both in 
general and for institutions more exposed to the construction and property development sec-
tor (Chart 2.3).
Collateral and, more specifically, how much of the loan it represents, limits the loss in the event 
of default on that loan. In Spain, in mortgage loans granted to non-financial corporations and 
sole proprietorships (92% of which are first mortgages), exposures with a LTV (ratio of the loan 
amount to the collateral value) below 80% account for 87.4% of the total risk, while the amount 
of exposures with a LTV above 100% is marginal2 (Chart 2.4.A). A low volume of exposure in 
loans with a LTV above 80% is quite common in the Spanish mortgage market. 
Doubtful assets ratios are 
higher in lending to the 
sectors most exposed to 
the cycle, such as 
construction and property 
development…
… but the dispersion among 
institutions also reflects 
differences in risk selection 
and management.
Having real collateral limits 
the loss in the event of 
default.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
2. The Banco de España, through its Circular 6/2008, which introduces certain accounting changes, has increased the 
amount of information on the mortgage market which it requires institutions to report to it.
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Notable among these collateralised loans for their importance in Spain are those associated 
with the housing development sector. When analysing this sector’s impact on the financial 
system, it must be kept in mind that the exposure to the housing development sector consists 
of credit transactions which vary considerably both in loan purpose (for construction of princi-
pal residence or second home, among others) and in the collateral provided (mortgages on 
finished housing developments or on land, for example). A proper analysis would therefore 
require a detailed examination institution by institution and loan by loan.
Despite these reservations, some calculations can be made to put into perspective the scale 
of the problem. Four key parameters are used: the exposure and its nature; the probability of 
default on that exposure; the recovery, by realisation of the collateral, of part of that exposure 
(the complement, up to unity, of the loss in the event of default, or LGD); and the existence of 
sufficient recurring profits to withstand the losses arising on the bad debts. These parameters 
Analysis of the exposures 
linked to the real estate 
sector calls for institution-
by-institution and loan-by-
loan scrutiny.
Resilience of the Spanish 
credit system in the face of 
exposures arising from the 
property development 
sector.
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can be combined to carry out a simple but illustrative calculation of the degree of resilience of 
the Spanish financial system as a whole. Taking as a starting point the net operating income 
(roughly, profit before provisions) for 2008 and assuming a mechanical decrease of 10% in the 
following three years, the cumulative 2009, 2010 and 2011 net operating income would be 
sufficient to withstand a loss on the housing development portfolio of 40% (i.e. the sum of the 
net operating incomes for these three years represents 40% of the loans to the housing sec-
tor). Any loss on a credit portfolio can be broken down into two factors: the first is the probabil-
ity of default by the customer (default rate), and the second is the net loss in the event of de-
fault (LGD), which depends, among other things, on the realisable value of the collateral. This 
breakdown shows that the system could withstand a 40% default rate (three times higher than 
that of 1993 for this sector) and a net loss of 100% (much higher than any reasonable estimate 
and than past experience). Note that what is being assessed is the ability to absorb potential 
future losses caused by exposures to the housing sector taking into account only the capac-
ity to generate recurring income and disregarding the fact that loan loss provisions of €50 bil-
lion, at a consolidated level, had already been set aside as at December 2008. Evidently, these 
figures relating to the losses absorbable by the sector are not estimates, since they lie outside 
any reasonable range or known international past experience, both because of the high prob-
abilities of default and because of the very low recovery rates associated with that percentage 
of default. However, they allow us to put into perspective the resilience of the Spanish credit 
system as a whole.
Under lending to households, that intended for consumption purposes has a higher doubtful 
loans ratio (5.8% in June 2009, Chart 2.2.D). This is because consumer credit is closely 
linked to the business cycle, and particularly to the financial position of households. Any 
weakening affects consumer finance more than lending for house purchase, which has the 
lowest doubtful assets ratio amongst the economic sectors considered (2.9% in June 2009, 
Chart 2.2.D). In previous FSRs it was argued that house purchase lending (36% of total 
credit portfolio) traditionally had a lower default rate due to the special features of the asset 
acquired (houses are extremely important to households) and the type of business con-
ducted by institutions (traditional banking model). Nine of every ten mortgages granted to 
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that for house purchase is 
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households are first mortgages, and of these 79.7% are to purchase their primary residence. 
These figures demonstrate that the asset being financed is particularly important for Spanish 
households, especially in a country where a high percentage of households own their own 
home. The consequences of the traditional business model can be appreciated in the LTVs 
of these loans, since 81% of mortgage exposures to households have an LTV below 80% 
(Chart 2.4.A).
Spanish dynamic provisions have dampened the impact of bad debts, particularly in the initial 
stages of the outbreak. This does not mean that institutions delayed recognition of bad debts 
in results, but rather the contrary, since in the cyclical upturn, when defaults were low, the risks 
accumulated in balance sheets were recognised by reducing profits through the recording of 
provisions. Now that the downturn has arrived, this provision can be used by institutions 
(Chart 2.4.B). 
The effect of this mechanism on coverage ratios (provisions divided by doubtful assets) is that 
they diminish in situations like the present (they have gone from levels higher than 200% in the 
lower, a phenomenon 
explained by the 
characteristics of this 
market in Spain. Moreover, 
the risk exposure 
concentrated at high LTV 
levels is low.
Spanish dynamic provisions 
have dampened, but not 
delayed, the impact of bad 
debts on the income 
statement.
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upturn to slightly less than 60% in June 2009). Not only is this not a cause for concern, but it 
is expected, and even desirable, since under the Spanish system of dynamic provisions the 
funds set aside, with a charge to income, in upturns, can be used in times of difficulty. 
It cannot, however, be expected that dynamic provisioning alone will neutralise the negative 
impact of a downturn which at world level has turned out to be sharper than expected. This 
impact will be more serious for some institutions than for others, and overcoming it will require 
measures designed to put profitability on a sustainable path in the medium term.
Recently the Banco de España has clarified its rules on provisioning,3 particularly the calcula-
tion methods affecting credit backed by real estate collateral in the form of finished houses, 
offices or commercial premises, or rural properties. Thus the minimum provisioning percent-
ages set by the Banco de España Circular for credit transactions (which depend on the number 
of days past-due) will be applied to the loan amount less 70% of the appraised value of the 
collateral, which value must be updated with the utmost prudence. The wording of the Ac-
counting Circular could have led the reader to consider, since the provisions were set at 100% 
of the loan amount after two years, that the value of the collateral was zero. This was not con-
sistent with historical experience and was scarcely justifiable in respect of the recognition of 
the collateral, depending on whether the LTV was above or below 80%; this inconsistency is 
addressed in the new clarification. In any event, the clarification of the rule basically affects a 
volume of risk exposure which represents not more than 14% of total mortgage lending. More-
over, the accounting rule sets minimum percentages to be applied and it is the institutions 
which, on the basis of their historical experience, have to calculate their loss indices, adjusting 
upward the minimums set by the Circular. These minimums, particularly for some types of fi-
nancing such as consumer credit, may now seem low. 
Credit quality is deteriorating in all comparable European countries, which were posting doubt-
ful assets ratios similar to those of Spain in December 2008.4 The differences detected related 
to coverage, which was higher in Spain (Chart 2.4.C). The doubtful assets ratio of the large 
European institutions, at consolidated level and according to the information published, was 
around 3.8% in June 2009, while that of the large Spanish banks was 2.6%.
The international financial market crisis caused a widespread loss of confidence and, conse-
quently, the closure of the main funding markets. The central banks responded by taking 
measures, in many cases non-conventional (Box 2.3), to provide liquidity to the financial sys-
tem, while governments guaranteed the issues of financial institutions in order to smooth their 
access to the funding markets. These temporary and extraordinary measures remain in place 
because Spanish and international financial institutions are still finding it difficult to obtain fund-
ing.
However, recent months have seen a certain recovery in the international financial markets, 
although some markets which were very important before the summer of 2007, such as the 
securitisation market, remain closed. The relative recovery of markets has enabled institutions 
to launch issues on markets which, until a few months ago, were not operational, although 
institutions’ ease of access to these markets varies according to their financial position and to 
the expectations of financial agents in regard to them. So far this year Spanish deposit institu-
tions have issued mortgage covered bonds (excluding securitised bonds) amounting to €19.6 
billion, practically the same amount issued in the whole of 2008.
Dynamic provisions alone 
cannot prevent the impact 
of a sharper-than-expected 
deterioration in the Spanish 
and world economies.
The Banco de España has 
recently clarified its rule on 
provisions, which, in the 
absence of that clarification, 
could have been interpreted 
as meaning that the value of 
collateral was considered to 
be zero.
Credit quality is deteriorating 
in all European countries, 
the provisions set aside 
being higher in Spain.
Despite the improvement in 
the financial markets, the 
persisting difficulties 
provided reason for 
continuing the extraordinary 
government support 
measures.
Spanish institutions have 
resumed issuance of 
mortgage covered bonds,…
3. In this connection, see Box 2.2. 4. The latest available data were published in August 2009 by the ECB in “EU Bank-
ing Sector Stability”. They are consolidated-level data.
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The aim of this Box is, firstly, to recall the characteristics of the Span-
ish provisioning system; secondly, to review active management 
mechanisms for defaults and to spell out the Banco de España posi-
tion on them; and thirdly, to clarify the relative significance of these 
operations. 
Although their rate of increase has declined, bad debts will continue 
to rise in the coming months, and it is not possible to accurately 
predict how they will trend in the future. The ultimate losses associ-
ated with these bad debts largely depend on the collateral held. Many 
loans are granted to the real estate development sector (land, devel-
opments under way and finished housing) and their valuation is sub-
ject to uncertainty since, unlike the financial assets on the balance 
sheets of wholesale and investment banks (which are recorded at 
market value or fair value), these loans (which are recorded at amor-
tised cost) are very heterogeneous, they have no organised second-
ary markets and, therefore, their valuation is very complicated. Ac-
cordingly, the traditional practice has been to opt for a progressive 
recognition of impairment that allows the actual loss to be recorded 
over time and as further evidence on prices observed in highly frag-
mented and dispersed markets is obtained. 
Along these lines, the regulatory and supervisory criteria used in 
Spain, which are characterised by regulatory rigour in respect of ac-
counting, intensive inspection and transparency, offer a clear general 
framework for the valuation of assets and their attendant risks. The 
asset valuation system, and therefore the setting aside of provisions 
for loan losses in Spain, is based on rules that set a timetable of spe-
cific provisions with minimum provisioning parameters. Unlike other 
approaches, in which the amount of provisions to set aside is decid-
ed freely by each bank and its auditor, in Spain there is an additional 
rule on minimums (Annex IX of the Accounting Circular) where under 
the mere passage of time, without the bank obtaining reimbursement 
of an unpaid debt, is considered sufficient evidence of the decline in 
the recoverable amount of the loan, which should be covered by pro-
visions, thereby lessening profits. Given that the periods envisaged to 
record provisions for past-due loans are relatively short, after some 
time the coverage of the loss is ensured. Further, there is a require-
ment for provisions to cover not only past-dues but also those in 
which, due to other factors, it is estimated that the funds lent might 
not be recovered as and when contractually envisaged (doubtful ex-
posures for subjective reasons), and those in which some less de-
fined symptom of weakness is present, even if this is associated 
solely with developments in the borrower’s industry (sub-standard 
risk). Bank inspections encourage the early identification of these 
situations. In sum, the Spanish provisioning system is demanding, 
both in booms and recessions, and is recognised as such interna-
tionally. 
Finally, transparency is another key feature. This is the case in terms 
of both the rules to be applied, and their impact on the financial sys-
tem (the rules applicable and the interpretations clarifying them can 
be found on the Banco de España website, doubtful assets ratios are 
published monthly in the Bank’s Boletín Estadístico, and its Financial 
Stability Reports have offered highly detailed information on the 
Spanish financial system). 
One of the key management areas at all credit institutions is the pre-
emptive and palliative management of bad debts. Among the active 
management mechanisms for these situations are, firstly, the refi-
nancing of customers experiencing liquidity problems, but with busi-
nesses that have the ability to pay and are solvent over the medium 
term; and, secondly, dation in payment and asset foreclosure, when 
the customer does not have the ability to pay and the bank’s active 
management of the collateral may minimise the loss. The attitude of 
the Banco de España to these estimates is one of strict watchfulness 
since, although they are accepted management instruments in times 
of crisis, they should be prevented from being used to postpone rec-
ognition of the loss. Accordingly: 
– When the refinancing of large-value loans is agreed, the Bank 
analyses the business plan to form an opinion on its viability, 
and it subsequently monitors the degree of compliance with 
the envisaged steps of the plan. On the basis of this analysis, 
loans are classified case by case as doubtful, sub-standard or 
standard, and the corresponding provisions are required de-
pending on the terms laid down in the minimum-parameters 
rule and, in any event, on recoverability expectations. If retail 
loans are involved, provisions are also set and the policies pur-
sued by banks are examined, analysing the terms they offer to 
customers to bring instalment payments into line with their 
economic situation. Also, deferral of recognition of default is 
not allowed in those refinancing agreements which, owing to 
the facilities granted to customers in the short term, add great-
er uncertainty as to how the operation will unfold in the medium 
term. 
– In the case of dation in payment and asset foreclosure, banks 
have to update the appraisal value and, if this is lower than the 
amount of the loan net of provisions, they must provide for the 
difference. In addition, a provision must be made for another 
10% of the value resulting from the foregoing comparison at 
the outset, and a further 10% one year after the foreclosure, 
without the asset having been disposed of. It is further required 
that banks should have a plan to sell the assets acquired. This 
plan is monitored and, as the accounting rules stipulate, if the 
plan is not carried out, the loan has to be recorded as doubtful 
and the impairment of the assets recognised. 
In short, the use of these practices is part of the overall credit man-
agement process (loan approval, monitoring of the risk, recovery of 
problem assets), not only for Spanish institutions but also for any 
bank. Arrangements are in place for the oversight of these practices 
which, among other matters, require institutions to make write-downs 
from the outset. 
In any event, the assets affected by these transactions (refinancing, 
dation in payment and asset foreclosures) account for around 2.4% 
of the consolidated balance sheet. 
To conclude, in circumstances as complex as those currently in 
place, marked by an acute economic crisis and compounded in 
Spain by the adjustment of the real estate sector, analysis of the im-
pact of bad debts on the Spanish banking system cannot be simplis-
tic. On the contrary, a granular approach is needed that considers the 
heterogeneity of banks, the diversity of their operations and the differ-
ent bad debt management policies pursued. In any event, as indi-
cated throughout this FSR, the difficulties the Spanish banking indus-
try faces suggest that the FROB will step up its activity in the coming 
months.
BOX 2.2ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY ACTION IN RELATION TO BAD DEBTS ON BALANCE 
SHEETS
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BOX 2.3THE EUROSYSTEM’S COVERED BOND PURCHASE PROGRAMME
On 7 May 2009 the Governing Council of the ECB announced its 
decision to implement a programme to purchase euro-denominated 
covered bonds (which include Spanish mortgage and territorial cov-
ered bonds). Its purpose was multiple: (i) to provide for a lowering of 
money market forward interest rates, (ii) to ease the financing condi-
tions for credit institutions and firms, (iii) to give credit institutions the 
incentive to lend, and (iv) to improve the liquidity of large segments of 
the private debt market, since this segment of financing was one of 
those most affected by the financial crisis.
The €60 bn euro-area wide programme is implemented through di-
rect purchases by the various Eurosystem national central banks and 
the ECB. These purchases were made gradually between July 2009 
and June 2010 in primary and secondary markets. The counterpar-
ties may be those institutions which participate in Eurosystem mon-
etary policy operations and investment counterparties established in 
the euro area. Eligible assets are those covered bonds which fulfil a 
series of conditions regarding their eligibility, issue volume and de-
nomination, among others.
The implementation of the programme began on 6 July 2009. At the 
end of August the nominal amount of covered bonds purchased by 
the Eurosystem was €9,482 million: €5,085 million in July (€1,867 
million were purchased on the primary market and €3,218 million on 
the secondary market) and €4,397 million in August (only €243 million 
on the primary market in view of the small number of new issues in 
that month). The purchases until then are in line with the target of 
acquiring around €5 bn of covered bonds by month for twelve 
months. 
Generally, the purchase programme has contributed to invigorating 
the primary covered bond market which had been virtually at a stand-
still since September 2008. In fact, since it was announced in May it 
began to have positive effects by increasing issuance and cutting 
yield spreads. Since then covered bonds have been issued in Spain, 
France and Germany, but also in countries where, until then, issuance 
had been quite limited, as has been the case in Portugal, the Nether-
lands and Italy.
Trading activity on the secondary market has improved slightly al-
though it remains relatively moderate. Yield spreads on covered 
bonds have narrowed notably as a result of increased demand, espe-
cially for issuers with higher spreads. For example, the spread of 
high-quality Spanish mortgage covered bonds over the three-year 
midswap rate decreased from 100 bp on the date the programme 
was announced to 30 bp at the end of August.
The debt market is progressively opening for large institutions (in 2009 various Spanish 
institutions managed to issue €12.6 billion of debt without a State guarantee, Chart 2.5.A). 
The difficulties in accessing the market are still apparent in the amount of the issues backed 
by State guarantee, which, from February 2009 (when the first one was launched) to mid-
September amounted to the €39 billion, spread among 39 institutions in differing propor-
tions. 
The improvement in international financial markets, along with a wholesale funding policy con-
centrated on the medium and long term (Chart 2.5.B), reduces the risk for Spanish institutions 
stemming from the problems of raising funds. However, the same as for the institutions of 
other European banking systems, this is still a latent risk, albeit mitigated by the public meas-
ures adopted. 
The same as other euro area institutions, Spanish deposit institutions have been obtaining 
more liquidity from the Eurosystem since the financial crisis broke out. However, the increas-
ing rate of those requests for liquidity, which is in line with the size of the Spanish economy in 
the euro area, seems to have levelled off since February 2009, and, more importantly, contin-
ues to account for a small proportion of the consolidated balance sheet (1.9% in June 
2009).
The drastic changes in the funding markets following the crisis have led Spanish institutions to 
undertake a progressive restructuring of liabilities. To do this they have stepped up their efforts 
to attract deposits, thus strengthening their already traditionally robust retail funding base. This 
has been made easier for them by their retail traditional business which involves a close rela-
tionship with customers and flexibility to change their product mix, since they sell a high pro-
portion of pension funds, investment funds and insurance.
… and the larger ones have 
issued debt without need 
for any State guarantee.
Fund raising continues to be a 
factor of vulnerability, but to a 
lesser extent due to the 
improvement in the markets 
and, in the case of Spanish 
banks, to the concentration of 
maturities in the medium and 
long term.
The funds obtained from the 
Eurosystem by Spanish 
institutions account for a 
small proportion of their 
balance sheet.
Spanish institutions have 
stepped up their efforts to 
attract deposits, which is 
made easier for them by 
their business model.
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Time deposits of non-financial corporations and households were growing at rates around 
25% until December 2008, when, as noted in the last FSR, their rates of change moderated 
(5.5% in July 2009 and 4% in August 2009). The moderation of time deposit growth rates, 
which coincided with the onset of interest rate falls, was offset by the recovery of demand 
deposits (Chart 2.5.C). Total deposits taken from non-financial corporations and households, 
despite slower growth in recent months, continue to expand more rapidly than loans 
(Chart 2.5.D).
Spanish deposit institutions reported profit to June 2009 of €12,315 million (Table 2.2), 
down 18.6% on the same period a year earlier. The economic and financial setting, al-
though improved, continues to be difficult and, indeed, numerous international financial 
institutions, despite improved interim results in 2009, have reported losses or drastic falls 
in earnings.
From the standpoint of the medium term, income statement margins will come under down-
ward pressure. In the medium term, it does not seem feasible that business volumes will grow 
Deposits continue to grow 
more than loans.
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
The financial difficulties and 
those of the real economy 
continued to put downward 
pressure on income 
statements.
In the medium term the 
pressure on Spanish
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as fast as they have done in the past. Offsetting the more contained growth of activity by 
higher spreads between asset and liability interest rates, as has occurred in the past year, also 
seems to be an option which cannot be maintained to the same degree in the medium term. 
First, because if interest rates continue to be so low, loans will continue to adapt to these rates, 
while the capacity to keep reducing the cost of the deposits is more limited. Second, because 
if interest rates increase, this rise will probably pass through to costs more quickly than to the 
return on assets, at least during the transition to the new scenario. The downward pressure on 
income will intensify because bad debt growth has not yet run its course and therefore spe-
cific provisions will become another source of pressure in the coming quarters.
Hence the downside risk in the income statement confronting deposit institutions to varying 
degrees means that, depending on each institution’s outlook for bad debts and profitability in 
the medium term, they will have to undertake restructuring to adapt their operating costs to 
the new environment. An important lesson to be learned from the financial crisis is that, both 
in Spain and abroad, the financial system has generated an excess capacity, a situation which 
has to be corrected to be in a position to face the medium term adequately.
In the first six months of 2009, the net income attributed to the group decreased by 18.6% 
with respect to June 2008 (Table 2.2), which resulted in a fall in ROA from 0.98% to 0.71% 
(from 1.27% to 0.94% if ROA is calculated using consolidated profit before tax). The favoura-
ble performance of the net interest margin and the lower ratio of operating expenses to aver-
age total assets (ATA) were unable to offset the negative impact of the higher loan loss provi-
institutions’ results will come 
from the smaller volume of 
activity, the potential 
narrowing of interest rate 
spreads and the persistence 
of bad debts.
Despite the differing impact 
of these factors across 
institutions, the crisis has 
demonstrated the excess 
capacity with which the 
banking system has been 
operating.
In the first six months of 
2009, the net profit attributed 
to the group decreased by 
18.6% for deposit institutions 
as a whole,…
JUN-08 JUN-08 JUN-09
€m
% CHANGE
JUN-09/
JUN-08
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 78,757 -4.0 5.31 4.57
Financial costs 43,010 -21.1 3.53 2.50
Net interest income 35,747 30.2 1.78 2.07
Return from capital instruments 1,502 -5.4 0.10 0.09
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted
for using the equity method 1,277 -49.7 0.16 0.07
Net commissions 10,944 -0.6 0.71 0.63
Gains and losses on financial assets
and liabilities 5,863 -1.9 0.39 0.34
Other operating income 205 -37.3 0.02 0.01
Gross income 55,538 13.6 3.17 3.22
Operating expenses 22,990 9.4 1.36 1.33
Net operating income 32,548 16.7 1.81 1.89
Asset impairment losses
(specific and general provisions)
15,221 83.3 0.54 0.88
Provisioning expense (net) 903 -26.2 0.08 0.05
Operating profit 16,424 -10.5 1.19 0.95
Asset impairment losses (assets other than 
loans and credits) 1,309 639.6 0.01 0.08
Income from disposals (net) 1,155 -23.2 0.10 0.07
Profit before tax 16,270 -17.3 1.27 0.94
Net income 13,165 -17.6 1.03 0.76
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Income attributable to the controlling entity 12,315 -18.6 0.98 0.71
INCOME STATEMENT
Deposit institutions
TABLE 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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sions, in consonance with the rising bad debts and, to a lesser extent, the sluggishness of fees 
and gains on financial assets and liabilities (Chart 2.6.A). 
The lower profits put downward pressure on ROE, which decreased from 16.7% in June 2008 
to 12.2% in June 2009. This general trend was not uniform across institutions, both due to the 
differences in the starting level of ROE, and to the differing ability to cope with the negative 
impact on their income statements (Chart 2.6.B).
The net interest margin grew strongly in June 2009 (30.2%). The extent of this growth was 
affected by changes in the scope of consolidation of a large institution, but even so the in-
crease was across the board in all institutions.
The growth of the net interest margin, which reflects the importance of traditional business 
for the Spanish banking system, as opposed to other systems whose results are more de-
pendent on the performance of the financial markets, was made possible by the fact that fi-
nancial revenue decreased (–4% in June 2009) by less than financial costs (–21.1% in June 
2009). The interest rate reductions passed through to financial costs more than to the return 
on assets, and this offset the slowdown in lending activity. By contrast, the changes in the 
structure of funding on the liabilities side and of lending on the asset side acted to the detri-
ment of the net interest margin, basically due to the increase in doubtful assets, since these 
cease to earn interest and thus lessen financial revenue (Chart 2.7.A). The data available on 
the rates applied to new loans and deposits (marginal rates) indicate that the spread between 
them has increased, although it is doubtful whether this trend will be sustained 
(Chart 2.7.B). 
The growth of the net interest margin passed through only partially to gross income (13.6% in 
June 2009). The share of profit of entities accounted for using the equity method decreased 
(–49.7%), due to the lower contribution from these companies as a result of the difficult current 
circumstances and because various institutions sold investments the income from which was 
recorded under this heading in June 2008. Commissions followed the trend noted in the previ-
ous FSR, decreasing slightly (–0.6% in June 2009). Those associated with activity (collection 
… putting downward 
pressure on ROE, although 
to a varying extent across 
institutions.
The net interest margin 
grew strongly,…
… because financial 
revenue decreased less 
than financial costs.
Commissions and gains on 
financial assets and liabilities 
decreased slightly.
-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
 JUNE 2009
 JUNE 2008
B.DISTRIBUTION OF ATA BY ROE (%)
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Gen. and specific provisions
Results (eq. meth.
and cap. instr.)
Fees and commissions
Income on finan. transactions
Other
Operating expenses
Net Interest margin
A.DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN PROFIT
BEFORE TAX AS A PERCENTAGE OF ATA
%
DETERMINANTS OF RESULTS AND DISTRIBUTION OF ROE
Deposit institutions
CHART 2.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2009
and payment services) grew moderately, while the persisting difficulties in the financial markets 
and the stiffer competition with traditional deposits to capture savings make securities opera-
tions less attractive and reduce the commissions associated with the sale of non-bank finan-
cial products. Gains on financial assets and liabilities decreased by 1.9%, partly because they 
were affected negatively by the income from disposals recorded by some institutions in June 
2008. 
Operating expenses grew less than ATA, although at a fast rate (9.4% in June 2009). This 
growth was greatly affected by the acquisitions made by a large institution. Excluding this in-
stitution from the analysis, operating expenses remained unchanged with respect to June 
2008 (0.18%). In any event, the efficiency ratio improved from 43% in June 2008 to 41.4% in 
June 2009.
The moderation of operating costs expenses is reflected in the decrease in the number of of-
fices and employees in the business in Spain (Chart 2.8.A and Box 2.4 for a European com-
parison), but this process, which will necessarily vary depending on the circumstances of each 
institution, has not yet acquired the necessary momentum given the downside risks to results. 
Institutions, depending on their financial position, have to put even more emphasis on proc-
esses which enable them to rationalise their operating costs. These processes involve adjust-
ments to achieve the resizing needed against a background of slower growth of activity and of 
the economy in general. 
Operating profit fell by 10.5% due to the notable increase in loan loss provisioning (83.3% in 
June 2009), which reduced the operating margin by 46.7% (Chart 2.8.B). This increase in 
provisioning, offset only partly by dynamic provisions, is a consequence of the rise in bad 
debts (increase in specific provisions).
Operating expenses held 
unchanged with respect to 
June 2008, thus improving 
the efficiency ratio.
Institutions, depending on 
their financial position, have 
to put even more emphasis 
on processes which enable 
them to rationalise their 
operating costs.
The negative impact of 
specific provisioning due to 
rising bad debts explains why 
operating profit decreased by 
10.5% in June 2009.
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a. Marginal interest rates are those established in transactions initiated or renewed during the month  
prior to that of reference, such transactions being weighted by their volume. The asset-weighted 
marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to housing and consumer finance and credit 
to non-financial corporations, while the liabilities-weighted ones include, inter alia, fixed-term
deposits and repos.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2009
Comparison with the profits reported by European credit institutions as at December 2008 
shows that Spanish institutions still maintain a better relative position in terms of ROE, which 
is negative for the EU as a whole (Chart 2.9.A). The better position of Spanish institutions is 
based on higher efficiency, a higher net interest margin and a smaller negative impact of gains 
and losses on financial assets and liabilities.
The stock market performance of the major Spanish and European banks has improved in 
2009 to date, as has the likelihood of losses derived from CDS spreads. The large Spanish 
banks performed better than their European peers (Chart 2.9.B).
As a whole Spanish deposit institutions ended 2009 H1 with a significant improvement in their 
solvency ratios which, consequently, remain above the regulatory minimum of 8%. More spe-
cifically, the total solvency ratio stood at 11.7%, 46 bp higher than in June 2008,5 while the tier 
1 ratio reached 9% (the minimum required is 4%), representing an increase of 86 bp6 
(Chart 2.10.A). Furthermore, the ratio comparing top quality tier 1 capital (capital and reserves 
net of goodwill) with capital requirements (the core capital ratio) also improved (from 6.8% in 
June 2008 to 7.5% in 2009).
Solvency improved for a large number of institutions, both in terms of the total ratio and of the 
tier 1 ratio (Chart 2.10.B). However, the level of the two ratios at institutions is heterogeneous, 
reflecting their different strategies and financial ability.
The reason why the solvency of Spanish institutions has increased is because requirements 
have grown very moderately and less sharply than capital.
Spanish institutions still have 
higher ROE and efficiency 
levels than European 
institutions.
Both stock market prices 
and the risk of default 
derived from CDSs have 
improved in 2009.
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
The solvency of Spanish 
institutions improved in June 
2009 and is higher than the 
minimum required.
This is a general 
improvement but there are 
differences between 
institutions as to the level 
and rate of the increase.
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5. The data for June 2008 and June 2009 were calculated according to Banco de España Circular CBE 3/2008, which 
transposes into Spanish law the EU Directives including the changes introduced by Basel II on solvency regula-
tions. 6. Solvency levels of the Spanish banking system as a whole were not significantly affected by a large Spanish 
institution’s acquisitions of foreign institutions. Thus, excluding this institution from the analysis, the solvency ratio would 
be 11.5% and the tier 1 ratio 9%.
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The moderate growth of risk-weighted assets (2.8% in June 2009) is in line with the slowdown 
in lending and none of its components were highly buoyant (Chart 2.11.A). Developments in 
requirements are explained by the rise in requirements for credit risk and, to a lesser degree, 
those for operational risk, while those related to market risk decreased due to the decline in 
exposures to equity securities.
The growth of total own funds moderated to 7%, 30 bp lower than one year ago, as a result 
of the slowdown of tier 1 capital (6 pp to 13.7%) and the reduction in tier 2 capital (–7.7%) 
(Chart 2.11.B).
Tier 1 grew following the strong increase in preference shares (23.4%), reserves (6.4%) and 
capital (23.2%), although the increase in capital can be largely attributed to private capital in-
creases undertaken by certain large institutions (see Note 6, Chart 2.11.C).
In a setting as difficult as the current one, in which primary markets seem to request 
more capital from institutions, the latter have issued preference shares, thus strengthen-
ing their own funds. These issues have been favoured by the relative market improve-
ment and, to a varying degree, institutions have also used their networks to place them 
among customers. The strengthening of tier 1 capital through preference shares has not 
prevented, as mentioned above, the core capital of the system as a whole from increas-
ing.
Tier 2 capital fell by 7.7%, (Chart 2.11.D), particularly notable was the strong drop in eligible 
provisions (–23.8%), due to the decrease of general provisions as a result of the increase 
in specific provisions (rise in doubtful assets). The decrease in corrections to valuation ad-
justments also had a negative impact, albeit to a lesser degree, due to lower capital 
gains.
Requirements grew 
moderately, to a large 
degree due to the 
slowdown in lending.
Capital grew more than 
capital requirements…
… driven in particular by
tier 1 capital.
Tier 2 capital fell, mainly due 
to the decline in eligible 
provisions as a result of the 
increase in specific 
provisions.
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a. The series represents the ratio between the MADRID SE Bancos index and the DJ STOXX Banks index.  
Figures above 100 reflect a better perfomance of Spanish institutions.
b. The series represents the ratio between the average spread of CDS for major Spanish institutions
and the average spread of CDS for major European institutions. Figures below 100 denote a better
perfomance of major Spanish institutions in terms of risk.
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A comparison of the Spanish banking system’s level of solvency with other European countries 
puts it in an intermediate position both in terms of the total solvency ratio and the tier 1 ratio 
(Chart 2.12. A). These data for December 2008 (the latest available data),7 are affected by the 
fact that many large European institutions received public funds to strengthen their capital, 
which is not the case of Spanish institutions. In spite of this, the most recent data on large 
The Spanish banking 
system’s solvency ratio was 
in an intermediate position 
in comparison with other 
European banking 
systems,…
BOX 2.4
In comparison with other European banking systems, the Spanish 
banking sector is characterised by its high number of offices per 
number of inhabitants (Panel A), a situation which is slightly less dif-
ferentiated when the offices per square kilometre are considered 
(Panel B). Likewise, the high number of offices per institution should 
be noted (Panel C), which employ a relatively low number of workers 
(Panel D). Assets per office are lower than in other banking systems 
(Panel E).
These characteristics have remained relatively stable between 
2003 and 2007, and reflect countries’ different banking models. 
The business performed by Spanish institutions is essentially retail 
banking which prioritises proximity to customers and building 
long-term relationships with them. Other banking systems with 
business models like the Spanish one are also more similar in 
terms of their office network, although their networks are not as 
extensive (Italy, Portugal and to a lesser degree, Greece and 
France).
The comparison of the number of offices with other European coun-
tries should not be interpreted as the need to follow the pattern pre-
vailing in these other banking systems. However, this comparison, 
taken with due caution, does suggest that given the current circum-
stances, the institutions, depending on their particular situation, must 
restructure in a way that enables them to adjust their cost structure 
to a setting in which business volume will not be on a par with that of 
previous years. And all the more so given that the ongoing deleverag-
ing will probably last for some time not only in the different banking 
systems but also in the different economies. Nevertheless, this ad-
justment of costs structures does not have to focus exclusively on the 
network but the costs associated with central services must also be 
taken into consideration.
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European institutions (published by the institutions and relating to 2009 H1), confirm that the 
tier 1 solvency of large Spanish institutions is in line with other banking systems in Europe.
As indicated in the last FSR, the international financial crisis underlined that institutions with a 
high solvency ratio had not been able to escape the serious consequences of the crisis’s direct 
impact. The reasons for this are varied and include the extent of the excessive leverage, which 
is low in the case of the Spanish banking system in comparison with other European countries 
(Chart 2.12.B).
The difficulties besetting the European insurance sector throughout 2008, which resulted in 
downward pressure on its profits and solvency, continue at present. The international financial 
crisis has increased interest-rate risk and the risk arising from lower stock market prices, which 
have diminished due to the improvement in markets in 2009. The ongoing weak macroeco-
nomic situation is also having a negative impact on the insurance sector.
There are other risks that the sector must take into account in its valuation models. In the life 
segment, a stronger-than-expected incidence of swine flu would have a negative impact, that 
would also affect medical insurance companies. In non-life, the complications would stem 
from the interruption of business at insured companies. In any event, currently available public 
information indicates that these elements of risk are containable.
As already indicated in the previous FSR, financial risks arising from the situation on interna-
tional markets are also affecting the sector in Spain, which nevertheless shows some differen-
tiating features that tend to cushion these risks, such as its limited exposure to equity securi-
ties. The situation of the real economy is having a negative effect on the sector as are low 
interest rates, making it difficult to attract business and causing the number of claims to rise. 
In any event, the solvency margin for the insurance sector as a whole stood at 242.2% in 
March 2009,8 above the minimum required.
…although Spanish 
institutions’ level of leverage 
is lower.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
8. Data provided by ICEA (Investigación Cooperativa entre Entidades Aseguradoras y Fondos de Pensiones —Co-oper-
ative Research between Insurance Companies and Pension Funds).
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Available information on business developments to June 2009 indicate that the premiums for 
the sector as a whole have grown in comparison with the same period in 2008, although this 
growth was moderate and centred on the life segment which nevertheless has to adapt to 
falling demand, low interest rates and increased competition in attracting savings. In the non-
life segment the decline in automobile sales negatively impacted this sector which has been 
partially offset by fewer claims. The worsening of the real economy has adversely affected 
multirisk home insurance, which is linked to housing loans and to the credit and suretyship 
insurance segment (in the latter case due to more claims).
The international financial crisis has had a direct effect on the investment funds sector, result-
ing in negative returns and the withdrawal of funds, due, partly, to greater competition from 
Premium growth was 
moderate and centred on 
the life segment but both life 
and non-life are subject to 
downward pressure
Returns on investment 
funds have improved but
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more traditional banking products in attracting savings. In the first half of the year the sector’s 
situation has improved which has led to a smaller fall in funds’ net assets (Chart 2.13.A), net 
withdrawals of funds still continue albeit at a slower pace (Chart 2.13.B).
Although pension funds have also been subject to the pressure of international financial diffi-
culties, and have benefited from recent improvements, the trend in their net assets is more 
stable over time (Chart 2.13.A), in keeping with a product type focused on long-term saving.
withdrawals continue albeit 
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3 Other issues
The global nature of the financial crisis and the intensity and speed with which its effects have 
fed through to the real economy, in particular since September 2008, have highlighted the 
need to review international coordination bodies in various fields, including that of global finan-
cial stability oversight. To address this challenge the role of the G-20 has been reinforced, 
extending its scope and functions. Further, to give greater political weight to the decisions 
adopted, the G-20 began to call summit meetings of the Heads of State/Heads of Govern-
ment of its members. The first of these Summits was in Washington in November 2008, where 
it was agreed: (1) to clarify the distribution of responsibilities between the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF); (2) to call on both institutions to rein-
force collaboration; and (3) that the FSF should admit new members so as to reinforce the 
legitimacy of the decisions adopted. In March 2009 the FSF increased its membership, admit-
ting all the G-20 countries that were not represented, Spain and the European Commission to 
its ranks. In late June this year it called the first meeting of the new extended FSF, which has 
been renamed as the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
The FSB is conceived as an institution geared to identifying the vulnerabilities of the financial 
system and to coordinating the response of national authorities and of the different interna-
tional fora. Its aims are to advise and supervise the implementation of international regulatory 
and supervisory standards, to promote the development of supervisory colleges and to sup-
port the preparation of contingency plans for the management of cross-border financial cri-
ses.
In Europe, in order to draw up specific proposals to strengthen European supervisory agree-
ments covering all financial sectors and to set up a more efficient, integrated and sustainable 
supervisory system, the President of the European Commission created a high-level group in 
October 2008 made up of seven independent experts and chaired by Jacques de Larosière. 
The Group’s recommendations have defined the road to take to create a new financial super-
visory framework in Europe. 
Substance is to be given to this new framework with the creation of a European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB). This body will be responsible for macroprudential supervision of the European 
financial system, with the aim of pre-empting and mitigating systemic risks, preventing finan-
cial risks spreading through the entire system, contributing to the sound functioning of the in-
ternal market and ensuring that the financial sector makes a sustainable contribution to eco-
nomic growth. While there will be broad representation on the Board’s General Council, which 
will include national supervisors, it will be the National Central Bank governors and the Euro-
pean Central Bank who adopt decisions, given their key role in financial stability matters. Fur-
ther, the European Central Bank, with specialist assistance from supervisors and from the 
National Central Banks, will provide analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support 
to this new Board. In the performance of its functions the ESRB will issue warnings and rec-
ommendations and oversee compliance therewith.
In the field of microprudential supervision, the European System of Financial Supervisors 
(ESFS) has been set up. The System comprises the national financial supervisors and three 
microprudential supervisory authorities, created drawing on the current European supervisory 
committees: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
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Authority (EIOPA). The ESFS combines responsibility for the daily supervision of EU financial 
institutions, which remains the responsibility of the national authorities, with specific tasks at 
the European level geared to enhancing the quality and consistency of supervision, strength-
ening the supervision of cross-border groups, and setting in place a single set of rules appli-
cable to all financial institutions. These new authorities may adopt legally binding decisions in 
specific cases relating to non-compliance with regulations and to disagreements between 
supervisors, and they will play a coordinating role in emergency situations.
Efficient collaboration between the ESRB and the ESFS will be vital if they are to function prop-
erly and ensure the interaction of the macro and micro levels of financial supervision, which is 
key to this reform. Legislative proposals to set this new framework in place were submitted last 
September and will foreseeably be approved in the Spring of 2010. 
Regarding supervisory arrangements in other countries, significant changes have also been 
considered. In the United States, the Administration proposed a reform which is still under 
discussion in Congress. It envisages reformulating the complex institutional arrangements in 
place for supervision. Under this reform a Treasury-presided Financial Services Oversight 
Council shall be set up to coordinate the different agencies and to identify systemic risks. Fur-
ther, the Federal Reserve shall identify and supervise all groups of a systemic nature (whether 
they are banks or not) and continue to supervise bank holding companies. Banks of a federal 
nature shall be supervised by the National Bank Supervisor, and a Financial Consumer Protec-
tion Agency shall be set up. The reform shall alter the procedure for systemic bank resolution, 
leaving the initiative for this type of action with the Treasury. 
In the United Kingdom, the effectiveness of the tripartite supervisory arrangements has been 
questioned, giving rise to various initiatives such as the new Banking Act. This legislation will 
consolidate and improve bank resolution arrangements, and add the achievement of financial 
stability to the Bank of England’s mandate. However, discussions are far from over. On one 
hand, the Treasury has considered the creation of a Financial Stability Board geared to dis-
cussing risks to the system as a whole and to proposing the pertinent measures to prevent 
risks in the long term. On the other, a Parliamentary Committee report has acknowledged the 
need to clarify the responsibilities of each of the three supervisory bodies, although it insists on 
the need to discuss beforehand the tools to address macrofinancial supervision. 
Beyond these proposals to change the financial supervision architecture, international debate 
and reform also turn on more specific issues, such as the current capital adequacy framework 
(Box 3.1) and international accounting standards. In this latter connection, both the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) have initiated steps to review international accounting standards. The aim of these re-
forms is to resolve the shortcomings highlighted by the international financial crisis as regards 
the accounting standards applied to prepare the corporate financial information directed at the 
capital markets. These reforms have been launched in the wake of the April 2009 G-20 com-
munique. The IASB has set in train a three-phase project – currently at the discussion stage – 
to review the accounting of financial instruments. The FASB has also started work in this 
connection, though it is at a more preliminary and undefined stage. Further, and given the 
importance of the convergence of accounting standards, both Boards have undertaken to 
work together in achieving this aim.
System of Financial 
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In November 2008, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors an-
nounced its intention to strengthen the Capital Accord in order to 
address the weaknesses relating to the regulation, supervision and 
management of bank risks that the financial crisis had highlighted. 
This intention coincided with the G-20 action plan drafted at the 
Washington summit on 15 November 2008. The G-20 called on the 
authorities to ensure that financial institutions have adequate capital 
to maintain confidence and urged international regulators to reinforce 
capital requirements for securitisations and structured products. 
In January 2009, the BCBS published a consultation paper on a set 
of proposals to strengthen the Basel Capital Accord, including most 
notably improvements in Pillar 1 on minimum capital requirements, 
Pillar 2 on the supervisory review process and Pillar 3 on market dis-
cipline. On the closure of the consultation period, the Committee ap-
proved the final versions of the documents at its July 2009 meeting. 
The Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 measures will come into force in late 2010, 
while the Pillar 2 measures have taken immediate effect, following the 
joint publication of the documents. 
The reforms to Pillar 1 relate to the treatment of the trading book and 
to capturing risk in securitisations and exposures to off-balance-
sheet vehicles. 
The new measures on capital requirements for the trading book in-
clude, among other changes, the introduction of a capital require-
ment for stressed VaR which will be added to the existing require-
ment for VaR. Further, replacing the former surcharge for event risk is 
the new charge for incremental default risk, which includes both de-
fault risk and that for the change in credit quality. Also, securitisations 
and resecuritisations1 included in the trading book will be generally 
subject to the same requirements as those for the investment portfo-
lio. A limited exception is envisaged for correlation trading, so that 
banks may develop models that capture incremental default risk, al-
beit subject to a very strict set of qualitative and quantitative require-
ments. Preliminary results show that capital requirements in respect 
of this portfolio might, on average, be between two and three times 
greater than the current requirements. 
As regards securitisations and off-balance-sheet vehicles, the Com-
mittee’s reforms include an increase in capital requirements for rese-
curitisations, as these proved to be a substantial source of losses 
during the crisis. Requirements have been raised in order to reflect 
their greater exposure to systemic risk and their complexity. In an at-
tempt to reduce overconfidence in external ratings, the new regula-
tions demand that banks should conduct more rigorous credit analy-
ses of securitisations and resecuritisations, even when they have an 
external rating. Otherwise, capital requirements shall be increased. 
Lastly, some improvements have been made to the securitisations 
framework by eliminating the favourable treatment to short-term li-
quidity facilities extended to off-balance-sheet vehicles. 
The Committee has also strengthened the Pillar 2 regulations in order 
to tackle the weaknesses detected in banks’ corporate governance 
and risk management, and to ensure that the right incentives are set 
concerning employee remuneration, which should be linked to long-
term results. The new Pillar 2 regulations require that banks: identify 
and manage their overall exposure to risks in a comprehensive man-
ner; identify risk concentrations and aggregate all direct and indirect 
exposures to the same counterparty, and to related counterparties, 
geographical areas and industries; address reputational risk focusing 
mainly on the bank’s liquidity position and on the non-contractual sup-
port to securitisations; improve valuation practices, especially for 
complex exposures recorded at fair value; and strengthen practices 
relating to stress exercises and capital planning. The principles on re-
muneration practices published by the Financial Stability Board have 
also been included. Adequate remuneration is a subject of particular 
interest to the Committee and one on which it continues to work.
Finally, the set of measures approved includes reforms to Pillar 3 on 
market discipline. During the crisis, the lack of transparency of struc-
tured products and of the risk and capital adequacy profiles of the 
banks investing in them posed an obstacle to market discipline. The 
additional disclosure requirements refer to securitisation exposures in 
the trading book, the sponsorship of off-balance-sheet vehicles, re-
securitisation exposures, risks associated with the creation of securi-
tisable portfolios and securitisation valuations.
This raft of measures approved in July is part of a broader programme 
whose aim is to strengthen the regulation of the banking industry and 
on which the BCBS continues to work. The work under way relates 
to enhancing the quality, consistency and transparency of capital 
within Tier 1: the introduction of a leverage ratio as a supplementary 
measure and of a minimum liquidity standard; measures to reduce 
procyclicality and recommendations to reduce the systemic risk as-
sociated with the resolution of international banks. The design of the 
measures proposed for the different areas should be finalised by end-
2009 with a view to studying their impact and calibration over the 
course of 2010. 
BOX 3.1RECENT REFORMS OF PILLARS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THE BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD
1. A resecuritisation is understood to be a securitisation in which at least one of the underly-
ing exposures is in turn a securitisation.
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